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Abstract: Since 1980, US corporate valuations have risen relative to assets and 
operating margins have grown. The possibility of sustained economic rents has 
raised concerns about economic dynamism and inequality. But rising profits could 
come from political rents or, instead, from returns to investments in intangibles. 
Using new data on Federal regulation and data on lobbying, campaign spending, 
R&D, and organizational capital, this paper finds that both intangibles and political 
factors account for a substantial part of the increase in profits, but since 2000 
political factors are more important. A difference-in-differences analysis finds that 
major expansions of regulation increase profits significantly. 
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Introduction 
Corporate valuations in the US have seen a sustained rise relative to assets over the 
last three decades; corporate profits have seen a similar sustained rise relative to sales. Figure 
1 shows the log of aggregate Tobin’s Q, the ratio of firm market value to firm assets, for the 
nonfinancial corporate sector. The black line (smoothed and dashed) shows the log ratio of 
aggregate firm value over firm assets from the US System of National Accounts.1 The gray 
line shows the aggregate estimate of log Tobin’s Q for a large sample of publicly listed firms 
described below.2 Both lines show a substantial rise in corporate valuations relative to 
tangible assets since 1980. Figure 2 shows measures of current profit flows. The black line, 
also drawn from the National Accounts, represents the ratio of the net operating surplus to 
gross value added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the 
ratio of aggregate operating income after depreciation to revenues for firms publicly listed in 
the US. Again, both series show a substantial rise, in this case beginning around 1990. 
Does this rise signal that US firms are extracting greater economic rents and, if so, 
what does that imply for economic dynamism and inequality? The implications are 
potentially troubling. A large literature associates regulatory rents with diminished dynamism 
because of wasteful rent seeking (Tullock 1967, Posner 1975) that creates barriers to entry 
(Olson 1982) or diverts talent from productive endeavors (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
1991). In addition, Stiglitz (2012) attributes much of the inequality in our economy to 
                                                
1 Aggregate firm value (total liabilities + inventories – current assets) over firm assets (nonfinancial assets 
excluding intellectual property products plus equity and investment fund shares) using data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, see http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Ni_FedBeaSna/Index.asp. 
2 Estimates of Tobin’s Q derived from firm microdata are typically higher than estimates derived from national 
accounts because of accounting and other differences. See Piketty and Zucman (2014). 
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political rent seeking while Piketty (2014) sees rising corporate valuations leading to greater 
wealth inequality and the rise of a rentier society. 
Yet not all rents arise from political rent seeking activity nor do all rents imply social 
waste. For example, firms can earn rents on innovations. These rents constitute an important 
incentive to encourage investment in innovation. Generally, firms capture returns on 
intangible investments as rents, that is, as supra-normal profits. This includes returns on 
R&D, on “brand capital,” and on organizational investments.  
This paper explores the roles of intangible investments and regulatory rents in 
accounting for the recent rise of corporate valuations and profits. Finding an economically 
substantial association between regulation and profits, I further explore the causal nature of 
this link and I consider other factors such as changes in industry concentration. 
Any attempt to understand the significance of economic rents must account for the 
source and nature of the rents for several reasons. First, if economic rents simply reflect 
returns to growing investments in new technology, they might signal greater economic 
dynamism, not less.3 Similarly, to the extent that economic inequality arises from rents, the 
nature of those rents matters. The rise in the capital share of corporate income (Figure 2) 
corresponds to a fall in labor’s share of income, one indicator of inequality (Piketty 2014). 
Again, the rise in markups might not be too troubling if it simply represents returns to 
investments in technology.  
Also, much of the increase in wage dispersion has been attributed to differences 
between firms or between establishments (Song et al. 2015). Furman and Orszag (2015) 
propose that rising corporate rents are shared with workers at affected firms, leading to 
                                                
3 In patent race models (Loury 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980), R&D spending can, in some circumstances, 
exceed the socially optimal level. But while such wasteful spending might not be socially optimal, it nevertheless 
leads to increased dynamism, perhaps excessively so. 
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rising inter-firm wage differences. But if firm rents are rising primarily because of greater 
investments in new technology, then pay might rise at those firms because of greater 
demand for technology-specific skills. Indeed, Dunne et al. (2004) find that a significant 
fraction of the growth in the dispersion of wages between plants is accounted for by 
differences in plant investments in computer technology. The story clearly means something 
different if firm rents are rising primarily because of regulatory capture.  
Accounting for the sources of rents 
Broadly, the aim of this paper is to account for the relative contributions of 
corporate rents from three sources: returns on intangibles, industry concentration, and 
government regulation. To do this accounting, I use a well-established empirical framework 
for estimating the contribution of intangible investments to firm market value. Beginning 
with Griliches (1981), numerous studies have used regressions on Tobin’s Q or firm market 
value to estimate the economic value of intangibles including R&D (Cockburn and Griliches 
1988; Hall 1993; Lev and Sougiannis 1996), advertising and marketing (Fullerton and Lyon 
1988, Villalonga 2004), union rents (Salinger 1984), patents (Hall, Jaffe, and Trachtenberg 
2005; Bessen 2009), and organization capital (Lev and Radhakrishnan 2005; Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou 2013). Using a large sample of firms listed on US public exchanges from 1970 
through 2014, I use this approach to estimate the association between firm market values 
and stocks of R&D, advertising and marketing expenditures, and organizational investments 
measured via sales, general, and administrative expense. I also use a regression analysis to 
test the relationship between firm operating margins and these intangibles. 
This framework can be expanded to include measures of industry concentration and 
government-created political rents. In the analysis below, I use standard measures of 
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concentration such as the share of revenues going to the top four firms in 4-digit NAICS 
industries. 
Measuring regulatory rents 
It is less obvious how to measure rents arising from governmental decisions. A 
variety of government actions can generate rents. Sometimes government creates exclusive 
markets for assets such as wireless spectrum or oil leases. Patents create market power, as do 
entry barriers that arise from costly regulation (Dean and Brown 1995). Antitrust policy 
affects industry concentration, rate setting in regulated markets can create rents, as do 
government payments in the form of contracts, tax breaks, subsidies and bailouts. 
I consider two approaches for gauging rents that arise from government regulation: 
measuring investments in corporate political activity and measuring the extent of industry-
specific regulation. Two measures of corporate political activity are lobbying expenditures 
and election campaign contributions. De Figuieredo and Richter (2014) review the literature 
on the impact of lobbying, finding effects across a wide range of policy areas. Another 
literature explores the association between legislative voting and campaign contributions. 
Ansolabehere, de Figuieredo, and Snyder (2003) review this literature, finding little evidence 
that campaign contributions influence voting. They conclude that this spending might be 
viewed primarily as a consumption good. However, legislative votes are only one channel 
through which firms influence regulation; campaign spending and lobbying might also affect 
the drafting of legislation (firms may benefit from the particular wording of laws), agency 
rulemaking, rate setting, and other regulator actions. Other empirical research suggests that 
some corporate political activity is directed to benefit managers rather than the firm, that is, 
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there is an agency problem (Hochberg et al. 2009; Yu and Yu 2011; Werner and Coleman, 
2015). 
Yet a variety of evidence shows numerous ways that rent seeking activities seem to 
pay for the firm. Case studies have found that corporate political activity is associated with 
favorable tax treatment (Richter, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009; Alexander, Mazza, 
and Scholz 2009), regulatory rate setting (Bonardi et al., 2006), tariffs (Mayda et al., 2010), 
government contracts (Goldman et al., 2013), and bailouts (Duchin and Sosyura 2012). 
Moreover, recent research finds associations between corporate valuations and profits and 
measures of lobbying activity and corporate campaign contributions (Cooper, Gulen, and 
Ovtchinnikov 2010; Hill et al. 2013; Chen, Parsley, and Yang 2015), including possibly 
corrupt activity (Borisov, Goldman, and Gupta 2016). However, Hadani and Schuler (2012) 
find a negative relationship between corporate political activity and firm market 
performance. Moreover, this literature has largely not explored the causal relationship 
between corporate political activity and firm performance; an exception is Werner and 
Roberts (2015) who use an instrumental variable estimation. 
In any case, while campaign spending and lobbying expenditures might be useful 
measures of rent seeking activity, they are likely incomplete measures of the ability of firms 
to earn rents from government for several reasons. First, reporting requirements have 
changed over time as well as the restrictions on spending.4 Second, most firms do not spend 
in either category.5 This does not mean, however, that most firms do not earn government-
                                                
4 The requirements on reporting of campaign spending and spending limits have been affected by a number of 
agency and legislative changes as well as Supreme Court decisions affecting campaign spending; data on 
lobbying was only reported following the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. 
5 In the Compustat sample of publicly listed firms in 2014, 18% spent on lobbying while 11% made PAC 
campaign contributions. In addition to being incomplete, this raises concerns about selection bias.  
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created rents. The full range of rent seeking activities is much broader than US campaign 
spending and the use of registered lobbyists: firms pursue favorable decisions from 
regulators on rate setting or leases on Federal property or tax treatments, they challenge 
regulatory rules and decisions in court, they make extensive investments in order to gain 
regulatory approval (e.g., clinical drug trials), they hire former regulators, and they may make 
major changes in business strategy in order to capture regulatory rents (Posner 1975). 
Moreover, firms pursue rents not only from the US Federal government, but also from state, 
local, and foreign jurisdictions. Finally, even if we could measure all of these rent-seeking 
activities, these are only inputs to rent generation; firms may earn rents from government 
actions even when these rents are not the direct result of the affected firm’s political activity. 
The complexity of regulation 
Ideally, we would like to measure the rent-generating potential of government 
regulations affecting different industries. I propose that the extent or complexity of 
regulation might reflect its rent-generating potential. Below I describe Regdata (Al-Ubaydli 
and McLaughlin 2015), a data source that provides industry-weighted word counts for each 
part and title of the Code of Federal Regulations for each year. These data might proxy for 
the rent-generating potential of regulation and hence might serve to capture the extent to 
which the rise in firm profits is associated with government regulation. 
Whether these data actually serve this purpose, however, is an empirical question. 
There are theoretical reasons both for and against my proposed use.6 There are two reasons 
why more complex regulation might be associated with greater rents. First, regulation might 
become more complex as firms exert greater effort at rent seeking. At least since Mancur 
                                                
6 See Peltzman (1989) for an overview of the theory of regulation. 
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Olson (1982, pp. 69-73), economists have identified several reasons why growing complexity 
might reflect rent seeking:7 rent seekers might exact special provisions and exceptions to 
regulations; because the general public has limited interest, special interests may succeed with 
more complex regulation; regulation may become more complex as firms find loopholes or 
ways to evade prior regulation, requiring new regulation. In all these cases, significant 
potential rents would encourage firms to contest the regulations aggressively, expanding the 
extent of regulation and making it a proxy for rent seeking effort.  
Second, the complexity of regulation might itself facilitate rent extraction (McCarty 
2013, Drutman 2015). For example, more complex regulation might make regulators more 
dependent on industry knowledge and expertise, facilitating industry influence. More 
complex regulation can serve as an entry barrier, providing rents to incumbents and larger 
firms (Nitzan, Procaccia, and Tzur 2013).8 
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that more extensive regulation might 
be associated with lower rents. In one view, regulators develop new regulations in order to fix 
market failures (as in Pigou 1920), including monopoly rents. Also, the “tollbooth” view of 
regulation (McChesney 1987; Djankov et al. 2002) sees regulation imposing costs on industry 
for the benefit of bureaucrats and politicians; that is, regulators extract rents earned by firms. 
In this account, regulation also decreases rents, but with different motivation. 
While these different views are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do imply that 
regulation and rents could be either positively or negatively correlated. Incorporating this 
                                                
7 See also Kearl 1983; Quandt 1983; Krueger and Duncan 1993. 
8 For example, Philip Morris supported legislation to regulate tobacco by the FDA, perhaps in order to gain an 
advantage against smaller rivals and potential entrants (James Flanigan, “Philip Morris' Tactic: FDA 
Regulation,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2001). The evidence on whether regulation tends to reduce entry in 
general is mixed. See Goldschlag and Tabarrok (2016) but also Bailey and Thomas (2015). 
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index of regulation into the regression analysis along with measures of campaign spending 
and lobbying expenditures, I find that all are positively associated with Tobin’s Q and firm 
operating margins but the association with the regulation index is particularly significant. 
However, this association must be interpreted carefully because it is not clear which way 
causality flows. As above, regulators might develop new regulations in order to fix market 
failures, including monopoly rents. In this case, regulations would be developed in response 
to economic rents rather than creating rents. To distinguish between these two effects, I also 
conduct several causality tests below. 
Estimation strategy 
Specification 
Viewing firm value as the present value of future profits, Hayashi (1982) provides a 
formal model relating firm value to the current value of capital stocks. Hayashi and Inoue 
(1991) and Hall (1993) extend this model to multiple capital stocks that might include both 
tangible capital and stocks of intangibles. I use a simplified variation of their models and 
include stocks of not only capitalized investments in productive intangibles, but also 
capitalized investments in rent seeking. 
I assume that profits are a function of an aggregate capital stock for firm j at time t 
(1) 𝐾!" = 𝛾!𝑘!"#! , 
where the 𝛾! coefficients represent the relative profit-generating potential of different types 
of capital stocks, 𝑘!"# (Hall 1993). Let i=0 represent tangible capital and normalize 𝛾! = 1. 
Assuming for simplicity that firms optimize variable inputs at each point in time, the 
production function has constant returns to scale, and there are adjustment costs to 
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investment, then Tobin’s Q, defined as firm market value over the current value of tangible 
capital, is equal to (see Appendix), 
(2)  𝑄!" ≡ !!"!!!!!!" = 𝑞!  1+ 𝛾! !!!"!!!" + 𝛾! !!!"!!!" +⋯ . 
Where V is firm value and p is the user cost of capital. Hayashi calls the variable 𝑞! 
“marginal q;” it is assumed to be approximately equal to 1 and, given competitive capital 
markets, it is equal across firms at any given time.  
This simple equation captures two intuitions. One intuition is Tobin’s original insight 
that the market value of a firm is related to the replacement cost of its assets. In a 
competitive market, firms will add capacity (either new entrants or existing firms) at the 
replacement cost of capital, driving prices down until, in long run equilibrium, the 
discounted stream of expected future profits (market value) equals the cost of those assets. 
However, because of adjustment costs, the long run equilibrium is not reached immediately. 
Instead, marginal q differs from unity, exceeding 1 when the capital stock is below the 
equilibrium level, less than 1 when there is excess capacity. Marginal q captures variation in 
firm value associated with the business cycle and also with shocks such as globalization. The 
second intuition is that intangibles and favorable regulation create supra-normal profits 
reflected in a market value that exceeds that of a competitive firm. 
I assume that disturbances are multiplicative so that, taking logarithms, 
(3)  log𝑄!" = log 1+ 𝛾! !!!"!!!" + 𝛾! !!!"!!!" +⋯ +  𝛿! ∙ 𝐼 𝑡 = 𝑇! +  𝜀!"#, 
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where I is an indicator function. I estimate this equation using nonlinear least squares.9 The 
coefficients 𝛾! tell us about the relative importance of the different capital stocks for 
generating profits.  
However, other factors could contribute to a sustained rise in profits in some 
industries. Firms might have greater market power in more concentrated industries, 
generating sustained higher profits. Although regulation might create market power as noted 
above, other independent factors might also create market power that could raise Tobin’s Q 
such as changes in antitrust policy, financial innovations facilitating mergers, or new 
technologies that generate strong network effects. To test for these possibilities I include an 
industry concentration measure in some estimates. Also, investors might demand higher risk 
premiums for more volatile companies, rewarding them with lower stock prices. Declining 
volatility might also contribute to rising values of Tobin’s Q. I also estimate specifications 
including a measure of stock volatility below. 
A comparable regression can be found using firm operating margins as the 
dependent variable. Because corporate valuations reflect investors’ expectations of future 
profits, current profits should exhibit similar associations with intangibles and regulation, 
albeit possibly with higher standard errors. Assuming a linear homogeneous profit function 
(see Appendix), current profits can be written as the sum of returns on the various capital 
stocks,  𝜋!" = !"!" 𝛾!𝑘!"#! , 
                                                
9 See Hall (1993) and Bessen (2009) for discussion of other specifications. Note that the Taylor series 
approximation of log (1 + 𝑥) ≈ 𝑥 for 𝑥 ≈ 0 does not work well for the data here because the implied values 
of x are too large. 
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recognizing that the rate of return on the aggregate stock will change over time. Using time 
dummies and adding an error term, operating margins can then be written as 
(4) 
!!"!!" = 𝛽! !!"#!!"! +  𝛿! ∙ 𝐼 𝑡 = 𝑇! +  𝜀!"#. 
This equation can be estimated using OLS. 
Data 
Sample 
The main sample consists of Compustat firms traded on US exchanges between 
1970 and 2014. I exclude firms that are missing data on market value, sales, and assets. For 
the regression analyses shown in the paper, I also exclude the 1 percent tails of the 
dependent variable to counter measurement error at the extremes.  
The calculation of Tobin’s Q requires estimating the replacement cost of the firm’s 
capital. For non-financial firms this estimate is based substantially on the firm’s investments 
in plant and equipment. Many financial firms do not report plant and equipment and the 
meaning of their capital assets is mainly financial in any case. I exclude these financial firms 
from the Tobin’s Q analysis, leaving a sample of 193,148 firm-year observations in an 
unbalanced panel; financial firms are included in the analysis of operating margins.  
Because regulation data is central to the analysis, I also restrict the sample to firms in 
industries that are assigned a regulation index. As described below, the sections of the Code 
of Federal Regulation are assigned weights for different industries using a computer 
algorithm. In some cases, sampling variance makes the industry match unreliable and the 
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industry is not assigned a regulation index in Regdata.10 At the 3-digit industry level, 31% of 
the firm-year observations lack a regulation index. In the analysis reported below, I exclude 
these observations, leaving a sample of 133,198. I repeated the regressions including them 
but coding the regulation index to zero. The results were quite similar except that the 
coefficient of the regulation variable was attenuated, as expected. 
For the regressions on firm operating margins, I include the financial firms. 
However, for these analyses I thought it appropriate to exclude startups that are in a 
predominately research phase, prior to meaningful “regular” sales. I excluded firm where 
research and development costs exceeded half of net revenues, leaving a sample of 135,968 
firm-year observations. 
Variables 
Key variables are defined as follows: 
The market value of the firm consists of the sum of all the claims on the firm, namely, 
the sum of the value of the common stock, the preferred stock (valued by dividing the 
preferred dividend by Moody’s Index of Medium Risk Preferred Stock Yields), long term 
debt adjusted for inflation, and short term debt net of current assets. While the market value 
of short-term debt is assumed to equal its book value, the market value of long-term debt 
depends on the age structure of the debt and the change in interest rates over time. I use the 
method of and Brainard et al. (1980) to estimate the market value of long-term debt. 
The value of assets is the sum of the net value of plant and equipment, inventories, 
accounting intangibles, and investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries adjusted for inflation. 
                                                
10 Specifically, the creators of Regdata use an algorithmic classifier including industries where the classifier has 
an ROC AUC score greater than or equal to 0.75 in 5-fold cross validation. 
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I calculate the replacement value of plant and equipment using the method of the method of 
Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) using the NIPA investment deflator.11 Note that financial 
firms often do not include plant and equipment on their balance sheets; these firms are 
excluded from the Tobin’s Q regression, but are included in the regressions on operating 
profits. 
The various capital stocks are calculated using the perpetual inventory method with 
deflators to calculate current value stocks. Following the literature, I assign a depreciation 
rate and pre-sample growth rate to each series. Robustness checks show that the estimated 
marginal effects are not sensitive to the particular choice of these rates. The R&D stock is 
calculated assuming a 15% annual depreciation rate and an 8% pre-sample growth rate (Hall 
1990); R&D expenditures are deflated using an R&D deflator. The advertising stock is based 
on advertising and marketing expenditures and assumes a 45% annual depreciation rate and 
5% pre-sample growth rate (Villalonga 2004, p. 217). The “organizational capital” stock is 
calculated using sales, general, and administrative expenditure (SGA), assuming a 15% 
depreciation rate and a 6% pre-sample growth rate. Note that these expenditures include 
advertising and marketing spending. They also typically include spending on IT services and 
most inhouse software development. Both expenditures are deflated using the GDP deflator. 
Financial statements do not report R&D, advertising, or SGA when the quantities 
are not material to the financial results of the firm. In these cases, the quantities might still 
be positive, but small. In the regressions, I code missing data for these variables to zero but I 
include a dummy variable flagging the missing data. 
                                                
11 Thanks to Bronwyn Hall for providing Stata code to compute this. The code was developed by Bronwyn and 
Daehwan Kim. 
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The lobbying and campaign expenditure data come from the Center for Responsive 
Politics.12 For each data set, I matched the company name (the client parent entity in the 
lobbying data, the short name of the political action committee for business PACs in the 
expenditure data) to Compustat companies.13 The lobbying data begin in 1998; the campaign 
expenditure data are assigned to the election year beginning in 2000. I assumed a 25% 
depreciation rate and a 6% pre-sample growth rate for each and deflated both using the 
GDP deflator. 
To measure industry concentration, I use data from the US Economic Census for the 
share of receipts going to the top four firms in each NAICS industry.14 I used the Census 
data for 2002 and 2012, interpolating and extrapolating linearly from 2000 through 2014. In 
order to measure concentration over the entire sample time frame, I also developed an 
alternative measure based on the share of 3-digit SIC industry revenues reported in 
Compustat going to the top three firms in Compustat.15  
To measure stock volatility, I measure the annual standard deviation in firm daily stock 
returns reported in the data of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Regulation index 
The final key variable is the index of industry-weighted regulatory constraints 
developed by Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin (2015). Prior researchers have measured 
regulatory complexity using page counts, word counts, or file sizes of the text of the Federal 
                                                
12 Data downloaded from http://www.opensecrets.org/resources/create/data_doc.php. 
13 For the lobbying data, of the 19,359 entities (companies, unions, trade associations, other organizations), 
11% were matched to Compustat firms; these firms accounted for 53% of all lobbying expenditures. Of the 
3,720 PACs, 38% were matched to Compustat, accounting for 54% of all expenditures.  
14 In Compustat, firms are assigned to NAICS at different levels of industry detail, from 2-digit to 6-digit. I 
matched to the concentration ratio for each level of detail. I also used an SIC to NAICS walkway for firms that 
listed SIC industries, but not NAICS. 
15 Details and results available from author. 
 16 
Register or Code of Federal Regulations (Coglianese 2002; Mulligan & Shleifer 2005; 
Dawson & Seater 2013; Crews 2011; Coffey et al. 2012). This new index improves on these 
measures by linking the titles and parts of the code to specific industries. Al-Ubaydli and 
McLaughlin use an algorithm to probabilistically assign each section of the Code to a specific 
NAICS industry. They do this assignment for sets of 2-digit, 3-digit, and 4-digit NAICS 
industries. The result is a time series of the extent of regulation for specific industries since 
1970. 
For example, Figure 3 shows the series for Title 12, Banks and Banking, weighted for 
NAICS 522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities. This figure clearly shows 
deregulation during the 1980s and later jumps in the extent of regulation in 1991 and 2010 
and after. These latter increases were associated with Truth in Lending regulations following 
the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, the Home Equity Loan Consumer 
Protection Act of 1988, and the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008. Further large 
increases after 2010 are associated with the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act. 
While this regulation index is not a capital stock per se, it can be incorporated into 
equations (3) and (4) in a way parallel to the capital stocks above. An intangible capital stock 
generates rents in proportion to the size of the stock. To the extent that regulations create 
market power, the absolute measure of rents generated should be proportional to firm 
revenues, all else equal. That is, an oligopoly markup of prices over cost would benefit all 
firms in an industry in proportion to their revenues.16 I thus measure the rent-generating 
potential of regulation for a firm as the regulation index for a given year times firm revenues. 
                                                
16 Some rents might take the form of lump sum distributions. Comparing a specification of this form (not 
scaled), the explanatory power of the scaled specification is superior. 
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I use 3-digit NAICS weighted word counts from Regdata version 2.2. The 3-digit data 
provide coverage for most of the Compustat sample (69%).  
Summary statistics 
Sample means, weighted by net capital in order to represent aggregate ratios, are 
shown in Table 1 at three different dates. Tobin’s Q increased sharply from 1970 to 2000 
and declined modestly since then. A similar pattern is seen in the R&D and advertising 
stocks. The SGA stock shows a secular decline while the regulation stock shows a large 
secular increase. Since 2000, industry concentration and lobbying stocks have increased; 
campaign spending has increased dramatically. However, both lobbying and election 
spending quantities are quite small compared to the other stocks measured. Finally, the 
regulation index shows strong growth, increasing nearly six-fold since 1970. 
Accounting for firm profits 
Accounting for Tobin’s Q  
Table 2 shows estimates of equation (3). I estimate the equation using Non-linear 
Least Squares with robust standard errors clustered by major industry group.17 All 
regressions include year dummies, as per equation (3) that are not reported. For observations 
missing data in the R&D, advertising, and SGA variables, I coded the variable to zero and 
included a dummy variable to flag the missing data. 
The first column uses only the stocks of intangible assets. These all have highly 
significant coefficients. The bottom panel of the table shows the extent to which the 
                                                
17 Using firm SIC codes, I classified firms into major industry groups according to the 9 major divisions of the 
SIC hierarchy with two additional groups for chemicals and pharma (SIC 28) and for tech (SIC 357, 367, and 
737). 
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coefficients can account for the change in log Q. I take the difference between the sample 
mean of the independent variable between the end and beginning of the sample period. 
These means are weighted by net capital in order to capture the impact on aggregate log Q. I 
multiply the difference in means by 100 times the coefficient to present the impact in 
percentages. As can be seen, growth in intangibles “explain” about one sixth of the rise in 
Tobin’s Q from 1970 to 2014. R&D and advertising had a positive impact, but SGA had a 
negative impact. 
Column 2 adds the regulation variable. The coefficient is significant and the implied 
impact on log Q is substantial. Combined, the regression variables account for nearly half of 
the rise in Tobin’s Q. 
Column 3 adds the volatility of the firm’s common stock and the measure of 
industry concentration derived from Compustat data. Volatility tends to reduce firm value 
while industry concentration increases it. But neither effect is large and the industry 
concentration coefficient is not statistically significant. This suggests that the substantial 
association between regulation and firm value is not explained by these measures of industry 
concentration. It could be that this concentration measure does not pick up the relevant 
effect of market power, for example, the relevant market might be much narrower than the 
3-digit industry classification. 
The regulation variable is an industry specific measure; most of the variation in 
industry restrictions is cross-sectional rather than time based. It is possible that the 
coefficient on the regulation variable might reflect some other industry specific variable that 
is omitted from the regression. To control for omitted industry specific effects, column 4 
adds dummy variables for major industry group. Compared with column 2, the dummy 
variables improve the R-squared modestly and decrease the coefficient on regulation 
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modestly, leaving it statistically significant only at the 10% level (P = .054). But the overall 
impression is that the regulation coefficient does not seem to be mainly reflecting some 
omitted industry specific variable. I will test this further below with a difference-in-
differences specification. 
Finally, column 5 adds the industry concentration ratio from the Economic Census 
and also stocks for lobbying and campaign expenditures. Because these data are only 
available for more recent years, this regression only covers from year 2000 through 2014. As 
in column 3, the industry concentration measure is positive but neither economically nor 
statistically significant.  
The lobbying coefficient is highly significant while the campaign-spending coefficient 
is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on both are much larger than one, 
suggesting that these investments appear to generate much larger returns than investments in 
plant and equipment. The high level of returns has been noted in the literature (Alexander, 
Mazza, and Scholz 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010; Hill et al. 2013; Chen, 
Parsley, and Yang 2015).18 Hill et al. (2013, p. 955) propose that various frictions might 
constrain the extent to which firms lobby so that they cannot increase spending until the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost. Another explanation is that lobbying and 
campaign spending comprise only a small part of firms’ investments in rent seeking. These 
variables serve as proxies for much more extensive investments and, so, their coefficients are 
inflated. This interpretation is supported by the large role played by the regulation variable, 
                                                
18 A case study by Alexander, Mazza, and Scholz (2009) found that one dollar in lobbying expense returned 
$220 in tax savings. Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) report that “in our sample, firms invest an 
average total contribution amount per year of $23,471 and earn an average increase in shareholder wealth of 
$163.8M per year.” 
 
 20 
which might reflect other rent seeking investments. The impact of regulation is larger than 
the impact of the other political variables combined. 
Overall, the relative contributions of the different variables to the change in Tobin’s 
Q changed after 2000. The variables representing intangible investments tended to decline 
while the political variables increased.  
Accounting for operation margins 
Table 3 shows four similar regressions on operating margins (operating income after 
depreciation before interest and taxes divided by net revenues). These are estimated using 
weighted least squares where the weights are deflated sales so that the results reflect 
aggregate profit margins. Here the independent variables are beginning-of-year stocks (that 
is, lagged stocks) divided by sales. As before, missing data on intangibles are coded to zero.19 
The right hand variables include R&D, advertising, SGA, lobbying, and election campaigns. I 
also include the regulation index and the net capital stock divided by sales, in order to 
capture returns on tangible capital as well. The bottom panel of shows the effect on the 
change in operating margins for each independent variable calculated at the sample means as 
in Table 2.  
The first two columns in the top panel cover the entire period (less the first year, 
dropped for lagged variables). The first column excludes political variables and, as in the 
previous table, these account for about one sixth of the growth in operating margins. 
Column two adds the regulation index. Both intangibles and regulation have statistically 
significant and economically substantial effects on operating margins, especially regulation. 
                                                
19 Because operating profit is calculated by subtracting expenditures from revenues, I use lagged variables 
because any measurement error will spuriously cause a negative correlation. In addition some time lag naturally 
arises before many of these investments pay off. 
 21 
Regulation accounts for over half of the increase in operating margins. The third column 
includes the political variables. Because campaign spending is assigned to election years, this 
regression covers only odd years from 2001 through 2013. Campaign spending has a large 
and statistically significant impact. During this period, however, the contribution of 
intangibles was negative because spending declined in these categories. In contrast, spending 
increased on political activities and the regulation index also grew. 
The bottom panel takes a deeper look into regulation; it repeats the regression in 
column two, but breaks out the regulation index into component indices for the top ten 
titles in the CFR plus a category for the remaining titles. The top ten titles account for 73% 
of the regulation words across the entire sample and most of the variation in the composite 
index. This regression also adds major industry dummy variables and clusters errors by major 
industry. The regulation coefficients are jointly highly significant and can more than 
“explain” the growth in operating margins. But clearly there is substantial heterogeneity 
across regulatory areas. Banking, the tax code, environmental regulation, and the remainder 
category all have substantial positive effects on firm profits on average; aerospace and 
Federal contracting regulations have a negative effect.  
In summary, the growth of intangibles and the growth of regulation and political rent 
seeking activities are substantially associated with the rise in corporate valuations and 
operating profits. However, since 2000, investments in intangibles have declined relative to 
tangible capital while regulation and election spending have continued to increase. Thus 
political variables “explain” much of the rise in profits and corporate valuations since 2000. 
Finally, the rents generated by regulation appear to be concentrated in a few areas of 
regulation and, hence, in a few industries, most notably banking, securities, and chemical 
manufacture, including pharmaceuticals. 
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Causality Tests 
However, this is only an accounting exercise. While greater regulation is associated 
with higher profits and valuations, this exercise does not necessarily imply that greater 
regulation caused the rise in profits and valuations. In fact, there might be good reasons why 
the causality could flow from higher profits to greater regulation. In the public interest 
account, regulation aims to correct market failures. Sustained corporate market power might 
be an indication of a market failure, providing a target for regulators. Historically, for 
example, large profits by monopolists encouraged “trust-busting” by Progressive reformers. 
Also, both profits and regulation might grow in response to some third factor. For 
example, major new technologies could bring profits and existing industries might seek new 
regulation to limit the effects of new technology. In this case it would be a mistake to 
assume that the regulatory rent seeking caused the profits. 
This section performs several tests of the causal link between regulation and 
corporate valuations and profits. 
Granger causality  
Granger causality (1969) provides a baseline test. This procedure tests whether 
lagged values of an independent variable have explanatory power beyond the lagged values 
of the dependent variable. Because the linear form of equation (4) lends itself to the analysis, 
I examine the causality regarding operating margins.20  
Table 4 shows these regressions for the composite regulation index (top panel) and 
tests for the joint significance of the relevant coefficients in the bottom panel for both the 
composite index and separately for major title of the CFR.  
                                                
20 In addition, Tobin’s Q analysis excludes financial firms, an important sector for this analysis. 
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The table shows that profits do not Granger-causes regulation, except for Title 21, 
Food and Drug regulations. But regulation does Granger-cause operating margins, although 
not with high significance for the non-enumerated titles.  
This finding is sufficient to reject the simple reverse causality story; if high profits 
caused regulators to act, then regulation would reflect lagged profits. However, Granger 
causality does not mean that regulation causes increased profits in the normal sense of 
causation. For instance, both profits and regulation might be caused by some third factor, 
yet regulation might respond more rapidly than profits, so that regulation would have 
explanatory power before profits. Such an explanation is possible, but the slow nature of 
regulatory change makes this sort of explanation seem unlikely. As noted, the regulatory 
approval process has built-in delays. In contrast, firms are generally assumed to respond 
quickly to profit opportunities. If some third factor is driving both new regulations and 
corporate profits, it seems hard to see how typically slow regulators would be able to 
respond several years before firms do. 
Major regulatory changes  
This Granger analysis considers all regulatory changes affecting the sample industries 
over three decades. Most regulatory changes are relatively small. It is possible, however, that 
firms and political actors behave differently when major regulatory changes are at stake.  
This might be the case, for instance, if public advocacy faces a collective action 
problem (Olson 1965). Those industries most affected by regulations will have the greatest 
incentive to invest in rent seeking, tending to dominate the ordinary process of regulation, all 
else equal. Other interests that are less directly affected have greater difficulty organizing 
collective action because the individual rewards are lower. Occasionally, however, broad 
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coalitions of opposing interests may be motivated to act, they may overcome their collective 
action problem, and when they do, one might expect major regulatory changes to follow.  
If this view is correct, then major regulatory changes might be relatively more 
affected by public interests that act in response to corporate market power. It might be the 
case that major regulatory changes are influenced by prior corporate profits even if that is 
not the case in general as suggested by the Granger analysis above. 
To consider this possibility, I conducted a Probit analysis of the factors associated 
with major changes in regulation, including lagged operating margins. I then conducted a 
difference-in-differences analysis to see if these large changes in regulation in select 
industries led to profit increases relative to a control group. I began by identifying the 
industries most affected by major changes for each of the top ten Titles of the CFR. I 
identified the 3-digit NAICS industry that had the highest number of weighted words for 
each Title. For example, NAICS 522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities, was the 
industry most affected by Title 12, Banks and Banking. The full list of affected industries can 
be seen in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
Next I needed to choose those years where the weighted number of words for each 
Title:industry pair increased substantially; these are presumably the events where the impact 
of regulatory change should be most visible.21 I needed to choose a threshold so that an 
industry might have a few events during the sample period, but not so many that the effect 
of one event tended to overlap other events.22 To do this, I first used a threshold of 100,000 
for the year-to-year difference in weighted words, excluding cases where a similar event 
                                                
21 I study decreases in a separate paper on deregulation. 
22 I tested a variety of alternative thresholds. While some created problems with overlapping events, the 
estimates I obtain below appeared robust to these choices. 
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occurred during the prior three years; this yielded seventeen events in six Titles. Then I 
repeated the process for the four remaining Titles, using a threshold of 50,000. This left a 
total of 24 events, covering all ten Titles (see Table A1). 
Finally, I explored the regulatory history of each change to understand the nature of 
the changes.23 Some of the changes were not substantive changes in regulation; for example, 
the FDA recodified Title 21 in 1974, leading to changes in word counts, but not real change 
in the law. Other major changes were not primarily relevant to the selected industry; in 
particular, we could not identify the industry-specific sections for changes in the income tax 
code (Title 26, Part 1). For these two reasons, I designated a sub-sample where documentary 
evidence suggests that the change in regulation was substantive and it affected the designated 
industry. 
The first question to address with this dataset of major regulatory changes is whether 
firm operating margins tend to increase the probability of a major regulatory change. Table 5 
shows Probit regressions on the occurrence of a major regulatory change. The sample 
consists of all firm-year observations from the industries that experience major changes.24 All 
regressions include year dummies and dummies for major industry groups. The first two 
columns include all events, the last two columns, only those events that are judged 
substantive to the affected industry. The coefficient for Log employment is statistically 
significant and the industry dummy variables are jointly significant, but coefficients for 
lagged operating margins are neither individually nor jointly statistically significant. In 
                                                
23 Thanks to Stefanie Weigmann for much of this analysis. See Table A1 for summaries. 
24 Other industries are not paired with the top ten Titles and are thus excluded from the assignment of major 
changes. 
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summary, these tests reject the hypothesis that high profits are responsible for subsequent 
major increases in regulation.  
Difference-in-differences 
In order to consider other possible causal interactions, I used these events of major 
increases in regulation to conduct a difference-in-differences analysis. Under the assumption 
that the control and treatment groups share a common underlying trend aside from the 
treatment, a difference-in-difference analysis compares the difference between the treatment 
and control groups before and after the event. A simple way to estimate these differences is 
with a regression of the form 
 (5)    𝑦! = 𝛼 ∙ 𝐼 treatment group + 𝛽 ∙ 𝐼 post event + 𝛾 ∙ 𝐼 treatment & post + 𝜀!, 
where 𝑦! is the dependent variable and I is an indicator function designating a dummy 
variable. The coefficient 𝛾 is the measure of the average treatment effect on the treated, the 
difference-in-differences (DID). 
For each firm in an industry affected by a major change, I constructed a panel 
consisting of the three years prior to the change and three years after.25 These firms 
constituted the treatment group. I constructed a basic control group by selecting firms in 
industries that did not experience major regulatory change (a change of more than 10,000 
words in either direction) during the year of the treatment event or during the preceding 
three years or the following three years.  
Table 6, column 1 shows the analysis for the entire sample of panels pooled for all 
events, using operating margins as the dependent variable. During the pre-event period, 
treatment firms had operating margins that were about 2% lower than the control group; 
                                                
25 Keeping only those panels that had data for the third year before and after. 
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after the event, treatment firms averaged operating margins were 4% higher, leaving a 
difference-in-differences of about a 6% increase in profits. Because of concerns about serial 
correlation (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004), the standard errors are block 
bootstrapped by firm using 200 repetitions. This increase is statistically significant. 
The critical assumption is that the treatment and control groups follow the same 
trend between the pre- and post-periods so that in the counterfactual case without treatment, 
the difference in differences would be zero. While this assumption cannot be directly tested, 
it can be thrown into doubt if the treatment and control groups exhibit different trends before 
the event. I estimated the trend as the change between three years before the event and the 
year before. The difference in the pre-event trend was large (.14), although not statistically 
significant.  
Column 2 repeats these calculations but only for those events judged to be 
substantive. Now profits increased by 8% in the treatment group relative to the control 
group; the pre-event trend difference was also smaller. Column 3 uses a different control 
group, namely all Compustat firms. These results are similar to column 2.  
Column 4 uses the original control group but adds controls for tangible and 
intangible assets. I do this by regressing operating income on these variable (and time 
dummies) as in Table 3, Column 1, and using the residuals from this regression as the 
dependent variable in the DID analysis. The residual is effectively a measure of excess 
profits. Now treatment group profits increase about 6% relative to the control group and the 
pre-event trend difference is negligible. Finally, column 5 does the same analysis, but weights 
the observations with a kernel-based propensity score (Heckman et al. 1998); that score is 
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based on a Probit regression using log employment and industry dummy variables as in 
Table 5.26 These results are close to those in column 4. 
This table presents the results for pooled panels. Table A1 in the Appendix shows 
results for separate events, using residuals for the dependent variable. Of the 15 substantive 
changes, 12 have positive coefficients. However, the role of Title 12 and the banking 
industry seems particularly strong. Repeating the regression in column 4 but excluding Title 
12, the DID estimate is smaller at 3.8%, but still highly significant (standard error of 1.3%). 
One might also be concerned about the effect of the recent recession. Excluding events after 
2008, the DID estimate is 4.1% (standard error of 1.3%). 
In summary, firms in industries experiencing a major increase in regulation saw 
significantly increased profits relative to control groups and this finding seems robust to 
several considerations. 
Discussion 
What does regulation do? 
The empirical findings suggest that increases in the complexity of regulation are 
causally associated with increased firm profits in the affected industries. These results are 
difficult to reconcile with the idea that firm profits induce greater regulation. They are also 
difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis that a third factor such as technology increases both 
regulatory complexity and firm profits—the timing for this story requires that the impact of 
the technological or other change occurs in exactly the year that the final rule is issued, yet 
                                                
26 I use the Stata diff routine developed by Villa (2012). 
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new regulation is usually years in the making, often involving new legislation, multiple 
proposed rules, and, sometimes, legal challenges (see Table A1). 
This analysis does not, however, explain how the profits associated with regulation 
are created. The possibilities include government grants of exclusive assets such as wireless 
spectrum or oil leases, the creation of entry barriers, either explicit (patents) or as an indirect 
of costly regulation, regulatory rate setting, and government contracts, tax breaks, subsidies, 
and bailouts. Some insight can be gained by looking at a case study.  
Crawford (2000) analyzes one of the events included in the difference-in-differences 
analysis. In response to concerns that excessive cable television prices reflected monopoly 
rents, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 “to provide increased consumer protection.” The FCC promulgated extensive new 
regulations the next year. Given this background, one might expect that these regulations 
reduced cable TV profits. Indeed, this is what regulators supposed; the Federal 
Communications Commission estimated that cable prices would fall 10%, saving households 
over $1 billion (FCC 1993). As such, this account seems to correspond to the public interest 
view that regulators respond to needs of the public; it also corresponds to the tollbooth view 
in so far as regulators took actions that might extract rents from firms (McChesney 1987; 
Djankov et al. 2002). 
However, households did not benefit from the new regulation overall. Crawford 
(2000) shows that the actual realized prices did not fall and about one third of households 
actually paid more.27 How did this happen? The complex regulations provided cable 
companies with substantial latitude to evade the price decreases by changing programming 
                                                
27 In the difference-in-differences analysis, the profit residuals increased relative to the control group, but the 
increase is not statistically significant (see Appendix Table A1). 
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mix and quality. The cable companies did reduce fees on their basic packages, but they also 
cut the programming provided in those packages, shifting desired programs to more costly 
bundles. In addition to influencing the details of this legislation and regulation, the cable 
companies engaged in substantial market-based rent seeking activity by changing their 
offerings. 
Thus the complexity of regulation appears to have created the opportunity for firms 
to earn greater rents despite the consumerist, anti-competitive intent of the legislation. This 
might seem consistent with Stigler’s (1971) theory of regulation that “as a rule, regulation is 
acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” However, 
this example does not seem to be an instance of captured regulators; the regulators aimed to 
lower cable prices, contrary to what the industry wanted, and they expected the regulation to 
reduce firm profits.28 Instead, the mechanism seems to be a sort of systemic capture 
facilitated by regulatory complexity (McCarty 2013, Drutman 2015). 
Regulation and rent seeking 
While the difference-in-differences analysis implies that more extensive regulation 
increases firm profits, it also does not explain what causes the increase in regulation. 
Corporate political activity such as lobbying might cause the increase, but that is not 
necessarily so. For instance, regulation might increase because technologies are getting more 
complicated. For example, new automotive safety technology appeared to provide a reason 
for increases in the size of transportation regulation in Title 49. On the other hand, lobbying 
                                                
28 Indeed, in response to an earlier account of this research, one of the 1993 FCC Commissioners posted an 
online comment consistent with the record that “Our agency was not captured. Indeed, the industry vilified 
me” Marginal Revolution, 6/15/2016, http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2016/06/regulation-
and-rents.html. 
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might also play a role in the development of these complex new regulations—lobbying and 
political spending are correlated with regulation.29 Given that greater regulation appears 
responsible for a sizeable part of the increase in firm profits, it would be puzzling if firms did 
not lobby or pursue other forms of rent seeking when faced with new regulation.30 Thus, 
while regulation helps profits, the link between regulation and corporate political activity 
appears complicated. 
Conclusion 
Much of the growth in corporate valuations and profits since 1980 can be accounted 
for by growing investments in intangibles, especially investment in R&D. But it appears that 
an even larger share of the rise in valuations and profits can be accounted for by factors 
associated with growing regulation and political activity, especially after 2000. Moreover, this 
relationship appears causal: increases in regulatory complexity appear to cause subsequent 
increases in profits.  
And these benefits appear to be large. Regulation corresponds to an increase in 
corporate valuations of about $2 trillion in the sample (Table 2, Column 2). Regulation and 
campaign spending are responsible for an increase in markups on the order of 1-2 percent 
(Table 3, Column 2). That corresponds to about a $400 billion increase in transfers from 
consumers to firms each year. 
Several qualifications affect the interpretation of these findings. First, regulatory 
rents are not substantial in most industries; they are highly concentrated in a small number 
                                                
29 Aggregating lobbying and campaign expenditures across 3-digit NAICS industries, the correlations with the 
total number of regulatory words weighted by industry relevance have coefficients of 0.63 and 0.33 
respectively. 
30 For instance, the regulation index is also correlated with the share of lawyers in an industry’s workforce 
(correlation coefficient of 0.44 excluding legal firms). 
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of industries. This has implications for the dispersion of firm profits that might be related to 
rising inter-firm wage inequality. 
Second, this study only looks at publicly listed firms. The effect of regulation might 
be quite different on private firms, especially small firms. Indeed, if rents are created via 
barriers to entry, one might expect large firms to benefit and small firms to be harmed. 
This raises an additional limitation. While this study finds a large, causal effect from 
regulation, it does not identify the actual mechanism at work. Nor does it identify the exact 
role of corporate political activity. These are important for understanding the implications of 
the rise in regulatory rents, their normative significance, and possible policy responses. 
Despite these limitations, the findings highlight the importance of looking at the link 
between regulation and rents broadly:  
• Some observers have highlighted the possible role of increasing industry 
concentration in generating economic rents (Grullon, Larkin, and Michaely 2015, CEA 
2016). Using two different measures of concentration, I find only a weak relationship 
with profits that is neither statistically nor economically significant. Regulation may be 
more important than industry concentration in generating rents and, for that reason, 
market power may be more than a matter for antitrust policy alone.  
• Compliance costs of regulation might be beneficial to some firms. Despite possibly 
substantial compliance costs (Crews 2011), complex regulation is associated with greater 
profits among public firms, perhaps because compliance costs create entry barriers. 
• As in the cable TV example, regulatory complexity can generate rents even when 
individual regulators are not “captured” or even “culturally captured” (Kwak 2013). 
While the corruption or biasing of individual regulators is surely important, the role of 
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complexity highlights the importance of a systemic notion of capture (McCarty 2013, 
Drutman 2015). 
• While I have linked regulatory complexity to firm profits, the link between corporate 
political activity and regulatory complexity is unclear and might well involve multiple 
paths of causation. Moreover, corporate rent-seeking likely involves much more than 
lobbying and campaign contributions. 
Thus although regulation appears central to understanding the link between politics 
and corporate rents, many questions remain unanswered.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean 
Year 1970 2000 2014 
Log Tobin’s Q 0.140 0.460 0.344 
Industry weighted regulation words (million) 0.360 1.330 2.135 
R&D stock / net capital 0.060 0.116 0.108 
Advertising stock / net capital 0.004 0.018 0.014 
SGA stock / net capital 0.742 0.628 0.615 
Standard deviation, daily stock market returns 0.021 0.031 0.014 
Four-firm share of receipts 
 
0.429 0.438 
Lobbying stock x 1000 / net capital 
 
0.168 0.204 
Election spending stock x 1000 / net capital 
 
0.001 0.017 
Number of firms 1445 3776 2456 
 
Note: sample means weighted by net capital. 
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Table 2. Log Tobin’s Q Regressions 
 1  2  3  4  5  
Independent Variables	 1970 - 2014	 1970 - 2014	 1970 - 2014	 1970 - 2014	 2000 - 2014	
R&D stock / net capital 0.738 (.129)** 0.772 (.134)** 0.883 (.148)** 0.735 (.120)** 0.567 (.104)** 
Advertising stock / net 
capital 0.600 (.171)** 0.501 (.119)** 0.471 (.100)** 0.459 (.140)** 0.787 (.236)** 
SGA stock / net capital 0.085 (.015)** 0.061 (.015)** 0.030 (.017) 0.065 (.014)** 0.081 (.022)** 
Regulation index / net 
capital   0.013 (.004)** 0.015 (.004)** 0.010 (.005) 0.013 (.004)** 
Compustat 3 firm 
concentration ratio     0.192 (.159)     
Standard deviation, daily 
stock returns     -2.562 (.625)**     
Four-firm share of 
industry receipts         0.032 (.111) 
Lobbying stock / net 
capital         25.257 (5.023)** 
Election spending stock / 
net capital         414.34 181.21* 
Dummies for missing 
R&D, advert., & SGA ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Industry group dummies       ✓    
Year dummies ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
No. observations 133,198  133,198  103,958  133,198  46,069  
Adjusted R-squared 0.545  0.559  0.556  0.568  0.655  
Percent contribution          
R&D stock / net capital 3.50  3.66  3.13  3.48  -0.30  
Advertising stock / net 
capital 0.60  0.50  0.56  0.46  -0.27  
SGA stock / net capital -1.08  -0.78  -0.65  -0.83  0.02  
Regulation index / net capital  5.70  6.26  4.39  1.84  
Compustat 3 firm 
concentration ratio     0.07      
Standard deviation, daily 
stock returns     -1.32      
Four-firm share of industry 
receipts         0.03  
Lobbying stock / net 
capital         0.10  
Election spending stock / 
net capital         0.71  
Change in log Q (percent) 20.39  20.39  16.59  20.39  -11.53  
Note: NLLS estimations of equation (3) including dummies for missing data. Robust standard errors clustered by 
industry group. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Sample is all US Compustat firms excluding 1% 
tails of log Q and financial firms. Percent contribution for variable x is 100 ∙ 𝛽! ∙ (𝑥! − 𝑥!) where the means are 
calculated for the beginning (0) and end years (1) weighted by net capital. 
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Table 3. Operating Profits / Sales 
A. 1971 - 2014	 1971 - 2014	
2001 – 2013,  
odd years	
R&D/sales, lagged 0.066 (.006)** 0.038 (.006)** 0.020 (.009)* 
Advertising/sales, lagged 0.018 (.013) 0.009 (.007) 0.087 (.030)** 
SGA/sales, lagged 0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 
Regulation words (mill.)   0.012 (.001)** 0.013 (.001)** 
Lobbying/sales, lagged     0.670 (2.839) 
PAC spending/sales, lagged     288.38 (41.93)** 
Capital/sales 0.008 (.001)** 0.008 (.001)** 0.009 (.001)** 
Major industry dummies 
	 	 	 	 	 	
No. of observations 135,968 
	
135,968 
	
29,798 
	
R-squared 0.178 
	
0.194 
	
0.255 
	
Percent contribution 
	 	 	 	 	 	
R&D/sales, lagged 0.35 
	
0.20 
	
0.01 
	
Advertising/sales, lagged 0.02 
	
0.01 
	
-0.02 
	
SGA/sales, lagged 0.01 
	
0.00 
	
0.00 
	
Regulation words (mill.)  	
1.79 
	
0.72 
	
Lobbying/sales, lagged  	  	
0.00 
	
PAC spending/sales, lagged  	  	
0.45 
	
Change in operating margin 2.51 
	
2.51 
	
2.26 
	
B.  	  	 Percent contribution	
R&D/sales, lagged  	 0.042 (.054)	 0.23 	
Advertising/sales, lagged  	 0.004 (.006)	 0.01 	
SGA/sales, lagged  	 0.000 (.000)	 0.00 	
Regulation by title, (mill.)  	    	
   Title 7, Agriculture  	 -0.001 (.032)	 0.01 	
   Title 12, Banking  	 0.199 (.015)**	 2.83 	
   Title 14, Aerospace  	 -0.187 (.020)**	 -0.55 	
   Title 21, Food & Drug  	 -0.018 (.042)	 0.01 	
   Title 26, IRS  	 0.083 (.010)**	 0.69 	
   Title 29, Labor  	 -0.023 (.011)	 -0.13 	
   Title 40, Environment  	 0.012 (.007)	 1.00 	
   Title 47, Telecomm.  	 0.013 (.016)	 0.10 	
   Title 48, Fed. Acquisition  	 -0.166 (.028)*	 -0.47 	
   Title 49, Transportation  	 0.027 (.012)	 0.22 	
   Other titles  	 0.020 (.012)	 0.42 	
Capital/sales  	 0.001 (.002)	  	
R-squared  	 0.328 	  	
Note: WLS estimations of equation (4), weighted by real revenues and including dummies for missing data and 
year dummies. Robust standard errors in parentheses in Panel A; errors clustered by industry in B. 
**=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. Sample is all US Compustat firms excluding 1% tails of 
operating margin and firms where R&D > .5*sales. Percent contribution for variable x is 100 ∙ 𝛽! ∙ (𝑥! − 𝑥!) 
where the means are calculated for the beginning (0) and end years (1) weighted by real sales. Panel B repeats 
column 2 of A, but breaks out separate titles and adds major industry dummy variables. 
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Table 4. Granger Causality Regression 
 
	
Do profits Granger-cause 
regulation? 
Does regulation Granger-
cause profits? 
Dependent variable: Regulation index Operating margin 
Operating margin     
   Lag 1. 0.000 (.000) 0.090 (.001)** 
   Lag 2. 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 
   Lag 3. 0.000 (.000) 0.001 (.000)** 
Regulation index 
       Lag 1. 1.047 (.003)** 0.078 (.014)** 
   Lag 2. 0.046 (.005)** -0.017 (.021) 
   Lag 3. -0.077 (.003)** -0.074 (.015)** 
No. of observations  109,046  
 
 108,938  
 R-squared 0.994 
 
0.091 
 
     F-test of joint significance of 
coefficients 
(P values) 
Operating 
margin 
coefficients  
Regulation  
coefficients  
Total 0.895 
 
0.000 
    Title 7, Agriculture 0.847 
 
0.000 
    Title 12, Banking 0.368 
 
0.000 
    Title 14, Aerospace 0.998 
 
0.000 
    Title 21, Food & Drug 0.004 
 
0.000 
    Title 26, IRS 0.489 
 
0.000 
    Title 29, Labor 0.506 
 
0.000 
    Title 40, Environment 0.052 
 
0.000 
    Title 47, Telecomm. 0.838 
 
0.000 
    Title 48, Fed. Acquisition 0.839 
 
0.000 
    Title 49, Transportation 0.212 
 
0.000 
    Other titles 0.860 
 
0.073 
  
Note: OLS estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. 
Regressions also include year dummy variables. The top panel reports regressions using the composite 
regulation index; the bottom panel reports F-test probability values for the joint significance of the relevant 
coefficients 
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Table 5. Probit Regressions of Major Regulatory Increases 
Sample All events Substantive for industry 
 1  2  3  4  
Operating margin         
   Lag 1. 0.000 (.001) -0.001 (.001) 0.001 (.001) 0.002 (.001) 
   Lag 2. 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 
   Lag 3. 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.000) 0.000 (.001) 0.000 (.001) 
Capital / sales   -0.001 (.001)   0.001 (.000) 
Log employment   -0.046 (.006)**   -0.042 (.007)** 
         
No. of observations 15,497  14,179  10,792  10,036  
No. of major increases 3,646  3,536  2,816  2,748  
Pseudo R-squared 0.203  0.214  0.106  0.118  
F-test of joint significance 
of operating margin 
coefficients (Prob. value) 
0.917  0.735  0.510  0.228  
 
Note: probit of the occurrence of major increase in the regulatory index during a given firm-year. The samples 
are drawn from the operating margin sample and are limited to observations in the industries linked to the ten 
largest titles in the CFR (see text and Appendix A1). Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample further to those 
events and industries that represent a substantive change in regulation for the affected industry. Standard errors 
in parentheses. **=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. All regressions include year dummies and 
dummies for 1-digit SIC industries; industry coefficients are jointly highly significant. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-differences on Major Increases in Regulation, pooled panels 
Sample All Substantive for industry 
 Dependent variable Operating margin Operating margin Operating margin Residual Residual 
 
Control group 
Firms without 
major change 
Firms without 
major change All public firms 
Firms without 
major change 
Firms without 
major change, 
propensity score 
weighted 
Control firms 3,237 
 
1,854 
   
1,854 
 
1,854 
 Treatment firms 3,960 
 
3,090 
 
3,090
 
3,090 
 
3,090 
 Difference before -0.023 (0.012)* -0.011 (0.013) -0.047 (0.012)** -0.039 (0.011)** -0.048 (0.007)** 
Difference after 0.040 (0.016)** 0.071 (0.017)** 0.025 (0.015) 0.020 (0.015) 0.008 (0.007) 
Difference in differences 0.063 (0.011)** 0.081 (0.011)** 0.071 (0.009)** 0.059 (0.011)** 0.056 (0.010)** 
Pre-event trend difference 0.142 (0.087) 0.022 (0.024) 0.030 (0.024) 0.005 (0.024) 
  No. of observations 28,338 
 
19,523 
 
12,453 
 
19,494 
 
19,159 
 
            
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are calculated by block bootstrapping by firm with 200 repetitions. 
**=significant at 1% level; *=significant at 5% level. The samples are pooled panels of firms in the treatment 
and control groups for three years prior to a major regulatory change and three years after. The first column 
includes all selected events; the other columns include only events where the regulatory history indicated a 
major substantive change affecting the relevant industry (see Table A1). The pre-event trend is the the change 
between three years before and one year before the event; the table reports the difference in this change 
between the treatment and control groups. Columns 4 and 5 use a residual from the regression in Column 1 of 
Table 3 as the dependent variable in the DID analysis. 
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Figure 1. Log Tobin’s Q 
 
 
Note: Solid lines are kernel smoothed. Black line is aggregate firm value (total liabilities + 
inventories – current assets) over firm assets (nonfinancial assets excluding intellectual 
property products plus equity and investment fund shares) for the nonfinancial corporate 
sector, using data from the System of National Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/Ni_FedBeaSna/Index.asp. Gray line is from 
Compustat data for non-financial firms, sample and variables described in the text. 
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Figure 2. Operating Margins 
 
 
Note: Solid lines are kernel smoothed. Black line is from the System of National Accounts, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. It shows the ratio of the net operating surplus to gross value 
added for the corporate sector (nonfinancial and financial). The gray line is the ratio of 
aggregate operating income after depreciation before taxes to revenues for firms publicly 
listed in the US. 
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Figure 3. Words in Title 12, Banks and Banking, weighted by relevance to NAICS industry 
522, Credit Intermediation and Related Activities 
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Appendix. Tobin’s Q equation 
I adapt a simplified version of Hayashi (1982) to incorporate multiple capital stocks 
where the aggregate capital stock, K, is a linear combination of different types of capital 
stocks, 𝑘! , 
(A1) 𝐾 𝑡 = 𝛾!𝑘!(𝑡)! . 
The 𝛾! coefficients represent the relative profit-generating potential of different types of 
capital (Hall 1993). Let i=0 represent tangible capital and normalize 𝛾! = 1. Assuming for 
simplicity that firms optimize variable inputs at each point in time and the production 
function has constant returns to scale, operating profits can be written as a linear function of 
aggregate capital, 𝜋 𝐾 𝑡 = 𝛼𝐾.  
Investments in each type of capital, 𝑥! , do not translate directly into increases in the 
capital stock because of adjustment costs. Adapting Hayashi, 
(A2) 𝐾 = 𝐺 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… ,𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾, 
where 𝛿 is the depreciation rate and G is linear homogeneous. The dynamic optimization 
problem is to maximize firm value, assumed to be the present value of future net profits, 
(A3) 𝑉 = 𝜋 𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝑝!𝑥!!!! 𝑒!!"𝑑𝑡, 
subject to constraint (A2), where 𝑝! is the price of investment good i And r is the discount 
rate. The present value Hamiltonian is 
(A4) 𝐻 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… ,𝐾; 𝑡 = 𝜋 𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝑝!𝑥!! +  𝜆 𝐺 𝑥!, 𝑥!, 𝑥!,… ,𝐾; 𝑡 − 𝛿𝐾  
and the necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
 !"!!! = −𝑝! + 𝜆 !"!!! = 0,  
(A5) !"!" = !"!" + 𝜆 !"!" − 𝜆𝛿 = −𝜆 + 𝑟𝜆, and 
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 lim!→! 𝜆 𝑡 𝐾 𝑡 𝑒!!" = 0 (transversality condition). 
Note that because G is homogenous of degree 1, 
(A6) 𝐺 = !"!"𝐾 + !"!!!! 𝑥! . 
Using the above, with some manipulation, 
(A7) !!" 𝜆𝐾𝑒!!" = 𝜆𝐾 + 𝜆𝐾 − 𝜆𝐾𝑟 𝑒!!" = −𝜋 + 𝑝!𝑥!! 𝑒!!". 
Taking the integral of (A7) with respect to t from 0 to infinity and using the transversality 
condition gives 
(A8) −𝜆 0 𝐾 0 = −𝜋 + 𝑝!𝑥!! 𝑒!!"!! 𝑑𝑡. 
Following Hayashi, marginal 𝑞 ≡ 𝜆 𝑝!, so that 
(A9) 𝑉(𝑡) = 𝜆(𝑡)𝐾(𝑡) = 𝑞(𝑡)𝑝!(𝑡) 𝛾!𝑘!(𝑡)! ,  
or Tobin’s average Q is (using t as a subscript as in the text) 
(A10) 𝑄! ≡ !!!!!!!! = 𝑞!  1+ 𝛾! !!!!!! + 𝛾! !!!!!! +⋯ . 
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